On versions of the Gibbard-Satterthweit theorem |
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| Author |
Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics, Lviv National University
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| Abstract |
A general problem is stated: describe all non-manipulable F -valued so- cial choice functions. The classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem gives such a description for the identity functor; some results are known also in the case of power-set functor and probability measure functor).
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| Keywords |
non-manipulable social function; strategy-proof function, functor
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| DOI |
doi:10.30970/ms.14.2.221-221
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Reference |
1. Bazylevych L. and Zarichnyi M., Monads in the social choice theory, in Ukrainian (to appear).
2. Barr M., Wells Ch. Toposes, triples and theories, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985. 3. Satterthwaite M. A. Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions, J. Econom. Theory 10 (1975), no. 2, 187–217. 4. Gibbard A. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance, Econometrica 45 (1977), no. 3, 665–681. |
| Pages |
221-221
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| Volume |
14
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| Issue |
2
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| Year |
2000
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| Journal |
Matematychni Studii
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| Full text of paper | |
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